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C
ompetition between banks and credit unions 
is interesting, in part, because it entails a for-
proﬁt sector (commercial banks) competing with
a not-for-proﬁt sector (credit unions).  In addition,
the distribution of market shares across ﬁnancial
intermediaries with different clienteles, service
offerings, and cost structures may have implica-
tions for overall ﬁnancial-sector efﬁciency.  This
article examines annual county-level observations
of the concentration of commercial-bank deposit-
market shares and household participation in
occupational credit unions for the period between
1989 and 1996.  We ﬁnd empirical evidence that
banks and credit unions directly affect each other’s
competitive positions in local deposit markets.
Previous research (Emmons and Schmid, 1999a)
ﬁnds a link between the concentration of local com-
mercial-bank deposit shares (as measured by the
Herﬁndahl index) and indicators of credit-union
efﬁciency (wage expense) and risk-taking (loan-loss
allowances).1 In addition, higher commercial-bank
deposit concentration is associated with higher
household participation rates—the fraction of those
who are eligible and who choose to join—at credit
unions (Emmons and Schmid, 1999b).  Thus, com-
petitive conditions among banks appear to inﬂuence
the behavior of credit unions and their potential
members.  It has not been clear, however, whether
the effects also run in the other direction—that is,
whether credit unions affect the structure of local
deposit markets that are dominated by commercial
banks and thrifts.
The purpose of this article is to investigate the
two-way interaction between banks and credit unions
in local markets.  Emmons and Schmid (2000)
develop and analyze a dynamic model of spatial
competition between banks and credit unions.
There is no consensus in the literature about how
best to model competition in ﬁnancial services, so
the model in that study provides a framework for
making comparisons with other work.  In this anal-
ysis, we provide a brief overview of the model in our
working paper and provide empirical results from
estimations of response functions of the local com-
mercial-banking sector and of households (who
comprise the credit unions).
CREDIT UNIONS AND 
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF 
LOCAL BANKING MARKETS
There is a large and growing literature that
investigates competition among banks (for exam-
ple, see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999; Amel
and Hannan, 1998; or Prager and Hannan, 1998).
Much less research focuses on the interactions
between credit unions (or thrift institutions) and
banks (Hannan and Liang, 1995).  This section
brieﬂy discusses the bank-competition literature




Mergers among depository institutions and
steady expansion of credit unions have been two
hallmarks of the U.S. ﬁnancial landscape in the
1980s and 1990s, but simply acknowledging these
trends is not sufﬁcient to characterize the evolution
of competitive conditions in local deposit markets.
The number of commercial-bank charters in exis-
tence has declined by between 3 and 5 percent annu-
ally since 1988, resulting in a nine-year (1988-97)
cumulative disappearance of 33 percent of all bank
charters (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999, Tables
1 and 2).  Mergers accounted for about 84 percent
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of disappearances and failures for 16 percent.
Deposit-market concentration, however, actually
declined slightly during this period.  Average com-
mercial-bank deposit Herﬁndahl indexes in metro-
politan statistical areas fell from 0.2020 to 0.1949,
and those in nonmetropolitan counties fell from
0.4316 to 0.4114 (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan,
1999, Table 1).  Meanwhile, credit-union member-
ship grew more than 38 percent in the decade
ending in 1996, while the country’s population
grew about 10 percent (U.S. Treasury, 1997, p. 24).
Does market concentration matter for prices
and proﬁts?  In a non-banking context, Tirole notes
that, “Most cross-sectional analyses ﬁnd a weak
but statistically signiﬁcant link between concentra-
tion and proﬁtability (1988, p. 222).”  With regard
to banking markets, Gilbert (1984) concluded in an
early review of the empirical literature that the eco-
nomic signiﬁcance of market concentration by banks
before deregulation was very difﬁcult to assess, not
least because of the poor quality of much of the
empirical research.  More recently, Shaffer (1992)
summarized the (lack of) current consensus by stat-
ing that the degree to which banking market struc-
ture matters for competition and performance is “a
hotly debated topic.”
The predominant empirical approach to banking
competition during the last several decades has
been the so-called SCP (Structure-Conduct-Perfor-
mance) paradigm.  The SCP approach remains the
dominant approach in the regulatory analysis of
antitrust issues in banking (Kwast, Starr-McCluer,
and Wolken, 1997).  This approach presumes that
measures of banking market structure, including
measures of market concentration, are good indi-
cators of the intensity of competition that occurs
(“conduct”) (Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 4-7).  The
intensity of competition inﬂuences the price for
ﬁnancial services, which are, in turn, assumed to
determine ﬁrms’ proﬁts (“performance”).  In a nut-
shell, the higher the concentration in the local bank-
ing market, the higher the prices are for ﬁnancial
services, and consequently the higher the banks’
proﬁts.  The policy implication is that higher market
concentration is associated with lower social welfare
and, therefore, higher concentration is undesir-
able.  However, the sources of differential levels of
market concentration are left unexplained.
Numerous banking studies demonstrate statis-
tical relationships that are consistent with some
aspects of the SCP paradigm, at least in a static
context (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Neumark and
Sharpe, 1992; Hannan, 1997; Prager and Hannan,
1998; Amel and Hannan, 1998).  On the other
hand, some evidence is inconsistent with the pre-
dictions of this framework (Shaffer, 1989).  More-
over, some of the evidence that is consistent with
the predictions of the SCP paradigm is subject to a
different interpretation.  For example, the link
between market structure and proﬁtability may be
spurious in the sense that an important variable is
omitted.  Some ﬁrms may have large market shares
simply because their costs are lower than those of
their competitors (Demsetz, 1973; Berger, 1995).
This is a desirable outcome, not one that reduces
social welfare.
It is not the purpose of this paper to test the
SCP paradigm.  We do not observe ﬁnancial-services
prices directly (corresponding to the “conduct” ele-
ment), for example, and our measure of perfor-
mance is not bank proﬁts.  The SCP framework is
related to our theoretical model, however, so it is
useful to outline what our model has in common
with the SCP paradigm as well as to clarify those
respects in which they differ.
The SCP paradigm is predominantly an empir-
ical approach and has been applied most often
without explicit reference to a theoretical model
of competition.  Consequently, the link between
higher prices and higher proﬁtability usually is
viewed as an empirical question.  It is precisely this
link between prices and proﬁtability, however, that
is questionable on theoretical grounds.  Even if
higher concentration leads to higher prices for
ﬁnancial services (and consequently to a decline in
demand), this does not necessarily translate into
higher bank proﬁts.  With free entry and exit, the
zero-proﬁt condition may hold even in a world of
oligopolistic competition.  If oligopolistic competi-
tors operate with ﬁxed costs—a reasonable assump-
tion in most cases—then higher concentration may
coexist with higher prices without violating the
zero-proﬁt condition.  In such a case, the higher
price would be caused by higher average costs due
to lower market output.2 Thus, while users of the
SCP paradigm typically draw the conclusion that
higher prices (caused by higher concentration) lead
to higher proﬁtability, this conclusion is not war-
ranted on purely theoretical grounds.  It remains
2 It is important to differentiate between ﬁxed costs and sunk costs
(Tirole, 1988, pp. 307-8).  Fixed costs that are recoverable are not
sunk and do not function as a barrier to entry.  Only sunk costs con-
fer market power.an empirical question whether higher concentra-
tion actually leads to higher proﬁtability—that is,
whether barriers to entry or exit matter.
Credit Unions in the Analysis of Banking
Competition:  Do They Belong?
The primary focus of bank antitrust enforce-
ment in the merger-review process carried out by
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
and by federal bank regulators (the Federal Reserve,
the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) is “the
availability of banking services, including loans
and credit, to small and medium-sized businesses”
(Nanni, 1998, p. 193).  This focus on the availability
of small-business credit means that credit unions,
which serve the household sector almost exclusively,
are ignored routinely for purposes of regulatory
analysis of banking market competition.  Com-
pounding the problem of deﬁning and measuring
the relevant market, the only comprehensive local-
market data available are annual observations of
commercial-bank and BIF-insured thrift deposits.3
Deposit data do not differentiate between commercial
and retail ownership (i.e., business and household
deposits), so comparisons of depository institutions
with different mixes of deposit customers are nec-
essarily imprecise.4
Direct empirical evidence that credit unions
matter in banking markets has been difﬁcult to ﬁnd.
Amel and Hannan (1998) conclude on the basis of
empirically estimated residual deposit supply elas-
ticities that commercial banks in alocal market
continue to be their own most relevant competitors.
That is, it does not appear that non-local or non-bank
financial institutions such as out-of-market banks,
credit unions, other thrift institutions, ﬁnance com-
panies, or providers of money-market mutual funds
are important determinants of deposit rate-setting
behavior by banks.
There is at least some indirect evidence that
credit unions matter to banks, however.  Bankers
themselves frequently complain about (possibly
unfair) competition from credit unions.5 Collectively,
banks have spent large sums of money lobbying
Congress to inhibit credit-union expansion (see
Emmons and Schmid, 1999b).  Thus, there is at
least a reasonable presumption that banks view
credit unions as competitors—actual or potential—
in at least some of their market segments, such as
the market for household deposits.
A MODEL OF BANK-CREDIT UNION
COMPETITION
The theoretical model in Emmons and Schmid
(2000) shows that an exogenous increase in com-
mercial-banking costs leads to higher bank concen-
tration (as measured by the Herﬁndahl index), which,
in turn, results in higher prices for the ﬁnancial
services banks offer.  In response, households who
were bank customers migrate to credit unions,
increasing credit-union participation rates and
shrinking the residual household market served
by banks—an additional (endogenous) source of
higher bank concentration.  This feedback, in turn,
unleashes a continuing endogenous adjustment
process of higher bank concentration and increas-
ing credit-union participation.  If a local deposit
market is in a stable equilibrium, this adjustment
process eventually comes to a halt with both sectors
retaining positive market shares; if not, one sector
or the other is driven out completely.  Likewise, an
external shock that leads to higher participation
rates at credit unions—such as legislative changes
favorable to credit unions—unleashes the dynamic
adjustment process outlined above.  Shocks that
reduce bank concentration or credit-union partici-
pation rates initiate processes of dynamic adjust-
ment in the opposite direction.
This article presents the empirical results of
two hypotheses derived from the theoretical model
in Emmons and Schmid (2000):
Hypothesis 1:  Higher deposit-market concentra-
tion leads to higher credit-union participation.
Hypothesis 2:  An increase in credit-union
participation leads to higher deposit-market
concentration.
The following section outlines the dynamic
interactions highlighted by the model.
The Dynamic Model.  In this section, we cast
the model’s hypotheses as a pair of response func-
tions.  These response functions allow for a one-
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3 The Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) of the FDIC insures some thrift institu-
tions while other thrifts are covered by the FDIC’s Savings Association
Insurance Fund (SAIF).
4 This shortcoming of the data means that evidence of interaction be-
tween commercial banks and other types of limited-purpose depository
institutions—such as credit unions—may be obscured by the inclu-
sion of markets in which they do not compete directly.  The evidence
reported in this article, therefore, understates the true extent of credit
unions’ effects on banks and may overstate the effects of banks on
credit unions.
5 Credit unions are exempt from federal income taxes, which allows
them to operate with low costs of capital.32 MAY/JUNE 2000
period response lag by both households (who com-
prise credit unions) and commercial banks. The
ﬁrst response function characterizes the behavior
of households (HH), who may join and participate
in the governance of occupational credit unions.
The second response function characterizes the
behavior of the commercial-banking sector, mem-
bers of which are governed by shareholders:
(1)                    
(2)                     ,
where rHH is the response function of households
and rCB is the response function of commercial
banks, and part and herf are the household partici-
pation rate (number joining divided by number
eligible) in occupational credit unions and the
commercial-bank Herﬁndahl index, respectively.
Equation 1 says that the level of household
participation in occupational credit unions reacts
with a one-period lag to the degree of concentra-
tion in the commercial-banking sector.  As described
above, the link between higher (lower) concentra-
tion and higher (lower) credit-union participation
is a higher (lower) price for ﬁnancial services offered
by banks.  Equation 2 states that the concentration
of the commercial-banking sector responds with
a one-period lag to the level of household partici-
pation in credit unions.
Solution to the Dynamic Model and
Stability Conditions.  This section outlines the
solution to the dynamic model described by equa-
tions 1 and 2.  Figure 1 presents a graphical illustra-
tion of a stable equilibrium.6 In brief, an interior
equilibrium is stable if (and only if) the commercial-
bank Herﬁndahl-index response function, rCB, is
steeper than the participation-rate response func-
tion, rHH (as in Figure 1).  If the local ﬁnancial-services
sector ﬁnds itself off the equilibrium value, M, say,
at points A or A¢, an adjustment process takes the
sector back toward the equilibrium, M (see arrows).7
Comparison of Equilibria.  Exogenous shifts
in the response functions might be due to tech-
nology shocks or to changes in legislation.  For
example, the commercial-bank Herﬁndahl-index
response function could shift to the right (see
Figure 2).  This could occur if the banks’ ﬁxed costs
of production increase, while all other exogenous
variables remain unchanged.  At the credit-union
participation rate prevailing under the original
equilibrium, M, the market cannot accommodate
the current number of banks if industry proﬁts
remain zero.  To restore a situation with zero proﬁts,
the number of banks must decline, which increases
concentration.  Higher concentration raises the
price of a unit bundle of banking services, which
leads to an increase in the credit-union participation
rate.  This corresponds to a shift of the commercial-
bank Herﬁndahl-index response function to the
right.  The new equilibrium is located at point M¢,
which signiﬁes higher banking-market concentra-
tion and higher credit-union participation.
Another example of an exogenous shift is an
upward movement of the participation-rate response
function (see Figure 3).  This could occur if, for
instance, the credit unions’ ﬁxed costs of produc-
tion decrease, while all other exogenous variables
remain unchanged.  The average costs of produc-
tion for credit unions now will be lower, leading to
herf r part t
CB
t = - ( ) 1
part r herf t
HH
t = - ( ) 1
REVIEW
6Emmons and Schmid (2000) also formally analyze the stability of the
(interior) equilibrium.
7Another possibility exists, however.  If the participation-rate response
function, rHH, is steeper than the commercial-bank Herﬁndahl-index
response function, rCB, the local ﬁnancial-services sector will diverge
even further from the equilibrium, M.  Starting from point A, the bank-
ing sector will crowd out the credit unions completely, leading to a
participation rate part = 0.  Starting from point A¢, credit unions will
drive out the banks, which leads to a participation rate part = 1. We
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a decline in the price they charge for a unit bundle
of ﬁnancial services.  As a consequence, marginal
households—those that were close to joining but
had not done so—will join their credit union, in-
creasing the participation rate at the prevailing
price charged by banks (as determined by the degree
of banking-sector concentration).  Such an increase
in the credit-union participation rate corresponds
to an upward shift of the participation-rate response
function.  The new equilibrium is located at point
M¢, which displays higher banking-market concen-
tration and higher credit-union participation.
The Credit Union Membership Act of 1998 may
constitute an actual example of the latter type of
shift (our sample ends in 1996, so we cannot eval-
uate this event directly).  Among other things, the
Act makes it easier for credit unions to adopt mul-
tiple-common-bond charters.  Although multiple
common bonds were not unknown before 1998,
there was some uncertainty about the legality of
these organizational forms.  In fact, a Supreme
Court ruling during early 1998 appeared to under-
mine many existing credit unions with multiple
common bonds and to eliminate the possibility 
of new ones forming.  As discussed in Emmons
and Schmid (1999b), the 1998 Act reversed the
essence of the Supreme Court decision and provided
a solid legal foundation for credit unions with mul-
tiple common bonds.  That article also investigated
the likely consequences of the law for credit-union
participation rates (for given prices charged by
banks) by simulating a theoretical model.  The
simulation results show that the multiple-common-
bond option tends to increase the fraction of
households who join occupational credit unions at
any given price charged by banks (see Emmons and
Schmid, 1999b, Table 1).8 Translating these simula-
tion results into the response- function framework
analyzed here implies that multiple-common-bond
charters shift the participation- rate response func-
tion upward.  As mentioned above, this causes
higher credit-union participation rates and higher
commercial-banking sector concentration.9
DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS
This section describes our data brieﬂy and
outlines the empirical methods we employ.  An
appendix describes our data sources and variable
construction; for more details on the empirical

















8 The regression results presented by Emmons and Schmid (1999b,
Table 5) cannot be interpreted as a positive inﬂuence of the multiple-
common-bond charters on the overall participation of (eligible)
households in occupational credit unions.  This is because the analy-
sis includes credit unions that might not exist if there were no multi-
ple-common-bond charters.
9 The regression results presented in Emmons and Schmid (1999b,
Table 6) cannot be interpreted as a positive inﬂuence of the multiple-
common-bond charter on the average operating costs of credit unions.
This is because the analysis includes credit unions for which the
operating costs of a single-common-bond charter might be prohibi-
tively costly.
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The observations in our empirical analysis are
annual credit-union participation rates and bank
Herﬁndahl-index levels in individual counties (and
independent cities).  In other words, we aggregate
information about credit unions and banks to the
county level.  We use these aggregated observa-
tions to estimate the response functions speciﬁed
in the appendix of Emmons and Schmid (2000).
To construct our county-level variables, we begin
with all federally chartered and federally insured
occupational credit unions during the period 1989-96.
Community, associational, and corporate credit unions
also exist, but occupational credit unions are by far
the dominant type of retail credit union, holding
almost 85 percent of member deposits (U.S. Treasury,
1997, p. 19).  Table 1 shows the Type of Membership
(TOM) codes that applyto the occupational credit
unions in our dataset.  These include credit unions
with single and multiple common bonds.  We do
not examine community, associational, or corporate
credit unions because they are less numerous than
occupational credit unions and their members and
purposes may differ substantially.  Including these
diverse types of credit unions would make interpre-
tation of our results more difﬁcult.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of our credit-union
dataset in each year according to the type of mem-
bership (TOM) group.  The most common type
(single and multiple-common bonds) is manufac-
turing, followed by government authorities.  The
number of credit unions covered remains fairly con-
stant at just over 5,000 during each year between
1989 and 1996, with a pooled total of 41,329, be-
fore screens are applied on the county level that
reduce this number slightly.
Table 3 summarizes the bank-concentration
measure we use, the Herﬁndahl index of bank
deposit shares calculated at county level, for each
of the years in our sample.  The median and mean
values of the annual county Herﬁndahl index levels
decline during our sample period, which is consis-
tent with the index values reported in Berger, Demsetz,
and Strahan (1999, Table 1).  The number of coun-
ties (and independent cities) for which values of the
Herﬁndahl index are calculated, varies slightly from
year to year because we discard counties that do
not have any banks or credit unions in a given year.
Table 4 gives an overview of the credit-union
participation rates at county level in our sample in
each of the years we examined.  As noted above,
we discarded counties in which the participation
rate was zero (i.e., there were no credit unions). 
We also discarded counties with participation rates
equal to one for econometric reasons, as discussed in
the appendix.  The range of participation rates in the
remaining counties is large, with a low of around 1
percent and a high of nearly 100 percent.  The median
and mean participation rates show a tendency to
increase until they peak during 1994 around 59
percent.  They then decline slightly, ending at values
during 1996 that are still notably higher than 1989.
We use control variables in the regression to
account for exogenous differences in the competi-
tive environment in cross section and over time.
We control for county-level differences in urban-
ization patterns by using each county’s population
density during each year as an exogenous regressor.
We also use state indicator variables in our regressions
to proxy for cross-sectional differences in state law
and regulation, and in economic activity.  We use year-
indicator variables to control for changes in economic
activity and legislation at the national level over time.
Further details are provided in the appendix.
Empirical Methods
We estimate an econometric model that pools
annual observations from 1,062 counties (and inde-
pendent cities) for the years 1989 through 1996.  The
dataset is unbalanced, which means that the number
Credit Union Type Of Membership
(TOM) Codes
TOM Code1 Type of Membership
4 Educational
5 Military
6 Federal, state, local government
10-15 Manufacturing
20-23 Services
34 Multiple group – primarily educational
35 Multiple group – primarily military
36 Multiple group – primarily federal, state,
local government
40-49 Multiple group – primarily manufacturing
50-53 Multiple group – primarily services
1National Credit Union Association (NCUA), Instruction 
No. 6010.2, July, 28, 1995.
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of counties included is not the same during each year.
The empirical model is a system of two “seemingly
unrelated” equations, which are the response functions
we derived in the theoretical model.  These are, ﬁrst,
the participation-rate response function and, second,
the Herﬁndahl-index response function.  Both variables
are bounded on the (0,1) interval.  We applied a logit
transformation to ensure that these variables are
unbounded, making a normal distribution of errors pos-
sible.  For more details, see Emmons and Schmid (2000).
Empirical Results
Our empirical speciﬁcations are based on the
predictions generated by the theoretical model in
Emmons and Schmid (2000) and outlined above.
Our two main sets of ﬁndings can be summarized
as follows.  First, we ﬁnd strong empirical support
for the predictions of the model in Emmons and
Schmid (2000) regarding dynamic interactions
between banks and credit unions.  In particular, we
ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant positive relationships
between the current credit-union participation rate
and the lagged value of the commercial-bank
sector Herﬁndahl index in a particular county. 
In addition, we ﬁnd a strong positive relationship
between the current value of the banking-sector
Herﬁndahl index and the lagged value of the credit-
union participation rate in a given county.  Second,
we document shifts in both the credit-union partic-
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
Descriptive Statistics for the Herﬁndahl Index1
Herﬁndahl Index Minimum Median Mean Maximum Standard Number of Observations
/Year Deviation (Counties)
1989 0.0344 0.2524 0.2707 0.9051 0.1280 1,035
1990 0.0358 0.2510 0.2699 0.8806 0.1279 1,039
1991 0.0360 0.2466 0.2661 0.8584 0.1259 1,040
1992 0.0341 0.2507 0.2654 0.8489 0.1221 1,042
1993 0.0444 0.2376 0.2611 0.8506 0.1218 1,037
1994 0.0519 0.2304 0.2572 0.8500 0.1205 1,039
1995 0.0512 0.2287 0.2532 0.8537 0.1178 1,047
1996 0.0535 0.2263 0.2519 0.8357 0.1150 1,038
1After eliminating 62 county-years for the reasons mentioned in the Appendix.
Table 3
Distribution of Credit Unions by TOM Code1
TOM Code(s) 4 5 6 10-15 20-23 34 35 36 40-49 50-53 Number of Observations
/Year (Credit Unions)
1989 326 40 410 481 126 601 948 603 848 740 5,123
1990 327 40 412 482 126 603 949 604 848 742 5,133
1991 329 39 426 484 127 620 942 614 848 745 5,174
1992 329 39 427 485 127 624 944 616 848 749 5,188
1993 331 40 429 484 128 627 952 624 851 753 5,219
1994 332 41 432 489 128 634 951 628 853 756 5,244
1995 332 41 432 489 129 637 936 621 857 757 5,231
1996 322 38 415 486 125 631 846 582 834 738 5,017
1Before eliminating 62 county-years for the reasons mentioned in the Appendix.
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ipation rate response function (upward) and the
commercial-bank Herﬁndahl index response func-
tion (leftward) during our sample period (1989-96).
Model-Speciﬁcation Tests
Before presenting and discussing the main
results of interest, this section reports values for
goodness-of-ﬁt measures and results of model-
speciﬁcation tests.
Explanatory Power of the Model.  We cal-
culated two sets of measures of ﬁt for the empir-
ical model.  The ﬁrst measures were an R2 and an
adjusted R2 for the system of equations, which
were 0.150 and 0.143, respectively.  The second
type of goodness-of-ﬁt measures was a pseudo R2
and an adjusted pseudo R2 for each equation, both
of which are reported in Tables 5 and 6.  The values
for the pseudo R2 (and the adjusted pseudo R2)
for the two equations were relatively close to each
other, which indicates that the model provides
about the same amount of explanatory power for
each equation.10
We report three Wald tests in Tables 5 and 6.
They compare the full model versus alternative
speciﬁcations that exclude one set of variables at
a time: all nonconstant regressors; the set of state
indicator variables; and the set of year indicator
variables.  All Wald test values are statistically
signiﬁcant.
Participation-Rate Response Function
Independent Variable  Coefﬁcient t-statistic
HERF (lagged) 2.005 22.446***
POPDENS 2.648 3 10-5 2.868***
YEAR: 1990 7.935 3 10-3 0.193
YEAR: 1991 2.300 3 10-2 0.434
YEAR: 1992 1.231 3 10-1 1.984**
YEAR: 1993 1.716 3 10-1 2.774***
YEAR: 1994 1.974 3 10-1 3.177***
YEAR: 1995 1.814 3 10-1 2.910***










Number of observations 8,317
**/***Signiﬁcant at the 5/1-percent level (t-tests are
two-tailed).
Table 5
10A traditional R2 is not well-deﬁned in a multiequation framework.
Therefore, we calculated a pseudo R2, which is the squared coefﬁcient
of correlation between the dependent variable and the “predicted
value” for the independent variables (i.e., the sum of the dependent
variable and the residuals).  The adjusted pseudo R2 was obtained
from the pseudo R2 in the usual manner.
Descriptive Statistics for the County Participation Rate1
Participation Rate Minimum Median Mean Maximum Standard
/Year Deviation
1989 0.0423 0.5600 0.5696 0.9997 0.1913
1990 0.0119 0.5567 0.5733 0.9959 0.1928
1991 0.0411 0.5623 0.5726 0.9974 0.1908
1992 0.0246 0.5787 0.5846 0.9964 0.1915
1993 0.0375 0.5893 0.5937 0.9985 0.1895
1994 0.0602 0.5897 0.5909 0.9998 0.1881
1995 0.0367 0.5833 0.5824 0.9983 0.1889
1996 0.0330 0.5776 0.5822 0.9987 0.1859
1After eliminating 62 county-years for the reasons mentioned in the Appendix.
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T est for Stability.  The dynamic model of
competition between banks and credit unions rests
on the two response functions discussed above, equa-
tions 1 and 2, that relate current-period behavior
to lagged indicators of the other sector’s behavior.
We used the delta method (Greene, 1997) to test
the equilibrium condition for our second-order dif-
ference equation, a stability condition.  The value
of this test under the hypothesis—that the two
response functions have the same slope—was
-9.59, which is statistically different from zero at
the 1-percent level.
Participation-Rate Response Function.
Table 5 presents the participation-rate response
function results.  As predicted, for given values of
the control variables, credit-union participation
rates are signiﬁcantly higher in local banking mar-
kets that have more concentrated banking sectors
in the previous year.  Taking into account the logit
transformation that was performed on both vari-
ables, it appears that an increase in the commer-
cial-bank Herﬁndahl index of 0.01 increases the
credit-union participation rate in a county by 0.0100.
The results for the control variables used in
the estimation also are interesting.  Table 5 shows
that participation rates are higher in counties with
higher population densities.  This indicates that
urban and suburban areas have proportionately
more credit-union members than rural areas have
on average.  It also means that credit-union partici-
pation tends to be associated with higher average
per-capita income levels because metropolitan
areas generally have higher average per-capita
incomes than rural areas.  As the year indicator
variables show, participation rates generally in-
creased during our sample period, holding bank-
ing market structure and population densities con-
stant (subsequent years are measured against the
baseline of 1989).  This also constitutes evidence
that credit unions are becoming more important
competitors in the retail (i.e., household) ﬁnan-
cial-services market.  A set of state indicator
variables was used in the regressions that are 
not reported here.
Herﬁndahl-Index Response Function.
Table 6 presents the Herﬁndahl-index response
function results.  As the model in Emmons and
Schmid (2000) predicts, for given values of the con-
trol variables, concentration in the commercial-
banking sector increases if the corresponding
county has shown an increase in the credit-union
participation rate during the previous year.  Banks
respond to losses in market shares with consolida-
tion (for example, in-market mergers that result in
the closing of branches), or simply with exit (for
example, bank failures).  Taking into account the
logit transformation of the variables, we ﬁnd that
an increase in a county’s credit-union participation
rate by 0.01 increases the Herﬁndahl index in the
county by 0.0035.  Thus, our evidence is consistent
with the notion that credit unions are important
competitors in the retail ﬁnancial-services market
in many localities.
Parameter estimates for the control variables
given in Table 6 are consistent with ﬁndings from
other studies of local banking markets.  We ﬁnd
that bank concentration is signiﬁcantly lower in
more densely populated counties, as is well known
from previous research.  For example, the average
Herﬁndahl index in Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSA) was 0.1949 in 1997, while it was 0.4114 in
non-metropolitan areas (Berger, Demsetz, and
Strahan, 1999, Table 1).  We also identify a signiﬁ-
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Herﬁndahl-Index Response Function
Independent Variable  Coefﬁcient t-statistic
PART (lagged) 3.428 3 10-5 19.072***
POPDENS -1.827 3 10-5 -4.216***
YEAR: 1990 1.762 3 10-2 1.000
YEAR: 1991 -5.196 3 10-3 -0.224
YEAR: 1992 -2.196 3 10-3 -0.081
YEAR: 1993 -4.058 3 10-2 -1.491
YEAR: 1994 -7.905 3 10-2 -2.922***
YEAR: 1995 -9.305 3 10-2 -3.476***










Number of observations 8,317
***Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level (t-tests are
two-tailed).
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cantly declining level of local-market bank concen-
tration during our sample period after controlling
for credit-union participation rates and population
density, which is consistent with other ﬁndings as
well (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999, Table 1).
State indicator variables were used in this equation,
too, but are not reported here.
Shifts in the Response Functions.  Tables 5
and 6 shed some light on the reaction of participa-
tion rates and commercial-bank Herﬁndahl index
values to changes in lagged values of the other vari-
able—i.e., movements along the response functions
—as well as movements of the response functions
themselves.  Shifts of the response functions over
time are reﬂected in changes in the population
density and in the year-indicator variables.  We
deﬁne an autonomous change as one that is due
to the year-indicator variables, which measure
changes relative to the base period, the year 1989.
Table 7 provides estimates of the (cumulative)
autonomous changes of the participation rate and
the Herﬁndahl index.  The autonomous changes in
both the credit-union participation rate and the
commercial-bank Herﬁndahl index were statis-
tically signiﬁcant for the later years of the 1990-96
period.  After taking into account the logistic trans-
formation we performed on the dependent vari-
able, we ﬁnd that participation rates increased by
0.0589 for reasons unrelated to the dynamic inter-
action of banks and credit unions or to changes in
county population densities over time.  Similarly,
county-level bank Herﬁndahl index levels decreased
by 0.0158 due to autonomous factors during the
period 1989-96.
We summarize the quantitative effects dis-
cussed above in Figure 4.  The ﬁgure shows the
shifts of the response functions in the directions
indicated by the data displayed in Table 7.  The orig-
inal equilibrium lies at point M.  Depending on the
relative strengths of the two shifts, the new equilib-
rium may exhibit a higher participation rate and a
lower Herﬁndahl index, as shown in the new equi-
librium, point M¢.  This is consistent with the 1.8-
percentage-point increase actually observed in the
median county participation rate during the 1989-96
period (see Table 4) and the 2.6-percentage-point
decrease in the median county Herﬁndahl index
(see Table 3) during the same period.
In the case of the credit-union participation
rate, the dynamic response highlighted by the
model in Emmons and Schmid (2000) was in the
same direction as the autonomous effect, so they
reinforced each other.  In the case of the commer-
cial-bank Herﬁndahl index, however, the effect
from the response function worked in the opposite
direction from the autonomous changes.  There-
fore, the autonomous effect of declining values of
the commercial-bank Herﬁndahl index dominated
the endogenous effect of increases in the Herﬁndahl
index due to credit-union competition during the
period 1989-96.
Autonomous Changes in Concentration
Year  Autonomous changes relative to
the median values in 1989








**/***Signiﬁcant at the 5/1-percent level in two-tailed
tests (based on Tables 5 and 6).
Table 7
Figure 4
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CONCLUSIONS
Credit unions are a growing part of the retail
ﬁnancial landscape in the United States.  Credit-
union expansion is a controversial issue, particularly
among bank and thrift owners and managers.  The
strength of opposition by these interested parties
alone provides some indirect evidence that credit
unions are relevant competitors to banks in some
market segments of retail ﬁnancial services.  This
article provides more direct evidence that is consis-
tent with the notion that credit unions and banks
compete directly.
The dynamic theoretical model of competition
between banks and credit unions in Emmons and
Schmid (2000) makes two predictions.  First, an
increase in the concentration of the commercial-
banking sector of a county in a given year will lead
to an increase in the participation rate at occupa-
tional credit unions in this county during the next
year, all else being equal.  In other words, some
households respond to increased concentration
among local banks by moving accounts to credit
unions.  Second, an increase in the rate of partici-
pation at credit unions in a given year will cause
more concentration in the commercial-banking
market of the respective county during the next
year, all else held constant.  Both theoretical predic-
tions are supported by the empirical results presented
in this article, suggesting that credit unions, indeed,
play a role in local deposit-market competition.
These results indicate that commercial banks and
credit unions are direct competitors in the local
household deposit market.
REFERENCES
Amel, Dean F., and Timothy H. Hannan. “Establishing
Banking Market Deﬁnitions Through Estimation of
Residual Deposit Supply Equations,” Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, working paper, 1998.
Berger, Allen N. “The Proﬁt-Structure Relationship in
Banking: Tests of Market-Power and Efﬁcient-Structure
Hypotheses,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking (May
1995), pp. 404-31.
__________, Rebecca S. Demsetz, and Philip E. Strahan.
“The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry:
Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future,”
Journal of Banking and Finance (February 1999),
pp. 135-94.
__________, and Timothy H. Hannan. “The Price-
Concentration Relationship in Banking,” Review of
Economics and Statistics (May 1989), pp. 291-99.
Demsetz, Harold. “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public
Policy,” Journal of Law and Economics (April 1973), pp. 1-9.
Emmons, William R., and Frank A. Schmid. “Wages and
Risk-Taking in Occupational Credit Unions: Theory and
Evidence,” this Review (March-April 1999a), pp. 13-31.
__________,and __________. “Credit Unions and the
Common Bond,” this Review (September/October 1999b),
pp. 41-64.
__________, and __________. “Banks, Credit Unions, and the
Dynamics of Competition,” Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis working paper 2000-006A, 2000.
Gilbert, R. Alton. “Bank Market Structure and Competition:
A Survey” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking (November
1984), pp. 617-44.
Greene, William H., Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed., Prentice
Hall, 1997.
Hannan, Timothy H. “Market Share Inequality, the Number
of Competitors, and the HHI: An Examination of Bank
Pricing,” Review of Industrial Organization (February
1997), pp. 23-35.
__________, and Nellie J. Liang. “The Inﬂuence of Thrift
Competition on Bank Business Loan Rates,” Journal of
Financial Services Research (June 1995), pp. 107-22.
Kwast, Myron L., Martha Starr-McCluer, and John D.
Wolken. “Market Deﬁnition and the Analysis of Antitrust
in Banking,” The Antitrust Bulletin (Winter 1997),
pp. 973-95.
Nanni, Anthony V. “Consolidation in the Banking Industry:
An Antitrust Perspective,” in Bank Mergers and
Acquisitions, Yakov Amihud and Geoffrey Miller, eds.,
Kluwer, 1998, pp. 191-206.
Neumark, David, and Steven A. Sharpe. “Market Structure
and the Nature of Price Rigidity: Evidence from the Market
for Consumer Deposits,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
(May 1992), pp. 657-80.
Prager, Robin A., and Timothy H. Hannan. “Do Substantial
Horizontal Mergers Generate Signiﬁcant Price Effects?
Evidence From the Banking Industry,” Journal of Industrial
Economics (December 1998), pp. 433-52.
Scherer, F. M., and David Ross. Industrial Market Structure
and Economic Performance, Houghton Mifﬂin Company,
1990.
Shaffer, Sherrill. “Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry.”
Economics Letters (April 1989), pp. 321-23.
__________. “Competitiveness in Banking,” in The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, Peter Newman,
Murray Milgate, and John Eatwell, eds., Stockton Press,
1992, Volume 1, pp. 414-16.
The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1990. World
Almanac Books, 1989.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS40 MAY/JUNE 2000
REVIEW
The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1997. World
Almanac Books, 1996.
Tirole, Jean. The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT
Press, 1988.
U. S. Treasury Department. Credit Unions, U.S. Government
Printing Ofﬁce, 1997.MAY/JUNE 2000 41
The Dataset
We analyze a dataset comprising all federally
chartered and federally insured credit unions dur-
ing the years 1989-96.  Before eliminating some
counties for some years, due to reasons mentioned
below, the credit-union dataset comprised 41,329
observations.  The dataset was obtained from the
Report of Condition and Income for Credit Unions
(NCUA 5300, 5300S), produced by the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA).  These reports are
issued semiannually in June and December.  We used
the December data from each year.  The business
years of the credit unions are on a calendar basis.
The ﬂows in the December income statements
cover the entire year, whereas the stocks in the
balance sheet are end-of-year values.
We concentrate on the following Types Of
Membership (TOM) groups among occupationally
based credit unions: educational; military; federal,
state, and local government; manufacturing; and
services.  This means that we do not include com-
munity credit unions, associational credit unions,
or corporate credit unions.  Lists of TOM classiﬁca-
tion codes are from the NCUA (Instruction No.
6010.2, July 28, 1995). 
We excluded observations for any of the
following reasons:
• Missing TOM codes
• Activity codes other than “active”
• Number of members or of potential members
not greater than one; applies to actual and to
lagged values
• Nonpositive values for total assets or lagged
total assets
• No banks operating in the respective county
(or independent city) during the year in
question or during the preceding year.
Total assets, number of members, and potential
number of members are end-of-year values.
We calculated county-speciﬁc Herﬁndahl
indexes as measures of concentration of the local
banking market.  A Herﬁndahl index is deﬁned as
the sum of squared market shares.  We measured
market shares as the fraction of total commercial-
bank and BIF-insured thrift deposits (as of June 30)
within a county (or independent city) based on
FDIC Summary of Deposits data.  These data are
available online at ,http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/..
We used population density to control for cross-
sectional differences across counties.  Population
density was calculated by dividing the total county
population by the total land area of the county (or
independent city).  Both the county population and
land-area data were obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau ,http://www.census.gov..  The population
data are Census Bureau estimates as of July 1 of the
corresponding year.  The land-area measurements
are from the 1990 census.
Deﬁnition of Variables
The county-speciﬁc credit-union participation
rate was calculated as a weighted average over the
participation rates of all credit unions in our dataset.
We used the number of potential members to weight
the participation rates.
The county-speciﬁc participation rates and
Herﬁndahl indexes, which serve as the two endoge-
nous variables, are bounded on the [0,1] and the
(0,1] intervals, respectively.  This conﬂicts with the
assumption of normally distributed error terms.
This is why we applied the logit transformation,
ln (y/(1 2 y)), where y is the participation rate and
the Herﬁndahl index, respectively, and where ln is
the natural logarithm.  To keep the econometric
results easy to interpret, we applied this transforma-
tion also to the lagged values of these two variables
that served as explanatory variables.
The logit transformation requires the values of
the variables to lie within the (0,1) interval.  Whereas
zero values for the Herﬁndahl index are not deﬁned,
zero values for the participation rate can occur.
This happens when there are counties without
occupational credit unions (of the TOM codes cov-
ered by this analysis).  This poses the problem of
data truncation, for which we did not control explic-
itly. During the period 1989-96, about 64 percent
of the U.S. counties (independent cities included)
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did not have credit unions of the type we analyzed.
There was one observation of a county (FIPS 8047)
that did not have a bank during 1988 only (and
thus, we could not calculate a lagged-Herﬁndahl
index for 1989).
When the participation rate or the Herﬁndahl
index are used as dependent variables, unit values
pose the problem of data censoring (the so-called
Tobit problem).  Observations of unit values for the
Herﬁndahl index did not occur, but there were 34
cases of unit values for the participation rate.  We
did not control for this Tobit problem because the
number of censored observations was low.  Instead,
we eliminated these observations from the dataset.
We also eliminated two observations of unit values
for the lagged Herﬁndahl index and 35 cases of
unit values for the lagged participation rate because
these observations represent corner solutions.  Be-
cause there was some overlap in these 72 cases of
unit values, we only needed to eliminate 62 obser-
vations (out of a total of 8,496 county-years).
There was a total of 3,141 counties (and inde-
pendent cities) in the United States during 1996,
including 43 independent cities (40 in Virginia) and
the District of Columbia.  The corresponding number
for 1989 was 3,139 (The World Almanac and Book
of Facts, 1989, 1996).  Overall, our study covers 1,061
counties (and independent cities), which is about
34 percent of the total.  There were 117 observations
(out of a total of 8,434 county-years), for which
there was either no bank in the county (one such
observation) or no credit union during a given year
or during the preceding year.
Deﬁnitions of variables and underlying data
sources are listed below.  For data taken from the
Report of Condition and Income for Credit Unions,
produced by the National Credit Union Administra-
tion, the relevant item numbers are in brackets.
Dependent Variables. We employed two
dependent variables in the regressions:
1) Participation Rate (PARTICIPATION):  Number of
actual credit-union members [CUSA6091]
divided by the number of potential members
[CUSA6092].  In the regressions, we use the
logit transformation, ln (y/(1 2 y)).
2) Herf:  Sum of squared market shares of
commercial banks within a county based on
total bank deposits.  By deﬁnition, the
Herﬁndahl index is greater than zero; its max-
imum value is one.
Independent Variables. In addition to lagged
values of the dependent variables, we used three
types of control variables:
1) POPDENS:  Population Density, population per
square mile in the respective county.
2) State-indicator variables; one of the state-indi-
cator variables was eliminated.  We do not report
parameter estimates for these variables because
of their number and because we do not wish to
place any particular interpretation on them.
3) Year-indicator variables; the indicator variable
for 1989 was eliminated.